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ACCESS TO PUBLIC DOCUMENTS IN KENTUCKY
INTRODUCTION
The public's right to know what goes on in government
holds a prominent place in a democratic society. At the heart
of democratic theory lies the concept of individual participa-
tion in governmental decisions. The abhorrence of secrecy in
government has permeated American political thought since
the inception of our country. James Madison described the
relationship between the public's right of access to information
and a democratic society in the following words:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who
mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with
the power knowledge gives. A popular government without
popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a
prologue to a farce or tragedy, or perhaps both. [Tihe right
of freely examining public characters and measures, and of
free communication thereof, is the only effectual guardian of
every other right. .... I
While the public's right to know has long been recognized,
the limitations placed on that right have varied with the times
and the circumstances. 2 In recent years, attention has focused
on expansion of the right to examine the operations of govern-
ment. Two notable expressions of this concern are the Freedom
of Information Act,3 which provides broader citizen access to
I Quoted in H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 129 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as CROSS]. For a discussion of the constitutional right to information under the first
amendment see Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional
Right, 27 IND. L. J. 209, 212 (1952).
2 CROSS 12-13.
Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1971), as amended, (Supp. I,
1975). The "Freedom of Information Act" is technically an amendment to the public
information section (§3) of the Administrative Procedure Act. It requires that each
agency make provision for public access to all adjudicative opinions and orders, state-
ments of policy and interpretations, staff manuals and instructions which may affect
a member of the public, and indices to such material. 5 U.S.C. § 552(2). In addition,
each agency is required to publish in the Federal Register a description of its organiza-
tion and the places in which information may be obtained, its general method of
channeling and processing all matters, and its procedural and substantive rules of
general applicability. 5 U.S.C. § 552(1). Most importantly, this statute prescribes a
procedure for enforcing its provisions in the courts and allows the assessment against
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the records of federal agencies, and Kentucky's Open Meetings
Law,4 often referred to as the "Sunshine Law," which opens the
meetings of state and local government agencies to the public
and the press. Both statutes clearly define the right of the
individual to gain access to governmental information and pre-
scribe procedures to effectively enforce that right.
In Kentucky, however, the public's right to view state and
local governmental documents has failed to keep pace with
these trends. Despite statutory recognition of this right,5 con-
fusion concerning its scope and lack of an efficient enforcement
procedure have precluded free exercise of the right to inspect
public documents. The Kentucky Court of Appeals' recent de-
cision in City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc.'
has greatly clarified the scope of this right. Yet, the opinion
contains ambiguities and fails to resolve the enforcement
problem. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the current status
of Kentucky law concerning access to public documents.
I. THE ST. MATTHEWS CASE AND THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO
INSPECT PuBLIc DoCUMENTS
In City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc.,7 the
the government of the petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees if the request for examina-
tion substantially prevails. 5 U.S.C. § 552(2).
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 61.805 et seq. (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as KRSI. The
"Sunshine Law" allows any member of the public or press to attend all meetings of
public agencies, committees, and subcommittees except in specifically enumerated
circumstances. It also stipulates that regular meetings must be scheduled and that
such schedules must be available to the public. The statute establishes strict guide-
lines for giving notice of special meetings. To insure compliance, formal actions taken
at meetings not in substantial compliance with these requirements are deemed voida-
ble, and any member of the public agency attending such meetings is subject to a fine
of $100.
5 KRS § 171.650 (1971). This statute provides:
Unless otherwise provided by law, all papers, books, and other records of any
matters required by law or administrative rule to be kept by any agency, and
all records arising from the exercise of functions authorized thereby, are
public records and shall be open to inspection by any interested person
subject to reasonable rules as to time and place of inspection established
under KRS 12.080. A certified copy of any public record, subject to any such
rules in effect, shall be furnished by the custodian thereof, to any person
requesting it, upon payment of such reasonable fee therefore as may be
prescribed by law or by administrative rule.
519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1974).
Id.
COMMENTS
Court of Appeals significantly modified the Kentucky law gov-
erning citizen access to public records. The lower court had
rendered a judgment ordering city officials to allow a local
newspaper to inspect various documents on file. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case with instructions redefining the
conditions under which access to such information should be
granted. In so doing, the Court explicitly abandoned the re-
strictive common law "special interest" rule8 and formulated
a three-part test for determining whether access to the public
records in issue should be allowed. Under the Court's approach,
it must first be determined that the document in question is
in fact "public." Second, the person seeking access must prove
that he has a "legitimate purpose" for viewing the record.
Third, the court must balance the public policy favoring free
access to governmental information against any countervailing
policy considerations which may exist in the particular case.
Moreover, in applying this test, once the requisite "purpose"
or "interest" has been shown by the petitioner, the custodian
of the record bears the burden of justifying his refusal to allow
inspection.' The importance of the Court's new approach ne-
cessitates an in-depth analysis of each aspect of this three-part
test.
A. The Meaning of "Public Record"
The Kentucky access-to-documents statute, Kentucky
Revised Statutes § 171.650 [hereinafter KRS], applies only to
"public records."10 Accordingly, under the statute, the first
inquiry is whether the record in question is "public" in nature.
It is apparent, therefore, that the meaning attached to the term
"public record" is of great significance.
Under KRS § 171.650, ". . . all papers, books, and other
records of any matters required by law or administrative rule
to be kept by any agency, and all records arising from the
exercise of functions authorized thereby, are public records
.", In St. Matthews, the Court indicated its willingness
" Id. at 815.
Id.




to give this language an expansive interpretation by stating:
"[O]rdinarily it would appear to be beyond cavil that all rec-
ords maintained by the state, county, or municipal govern-
ment as evidence of the manner in which the business of that
unit of government has been conducted are public records.
1 2
However, the Court qualified this sweeping definition by recog-
nizing that there may be exceptions to this general presump-
tion and by declining to do more than identify examples of such
exceptions. 3 Thus, although the decision "may," as the Court
noted, "serve to focus attention upon the question of what
constitutes a public record," 4 the Court's definition offers little
assistance in answering that question.
Two approaches have been developed in other jurisdictions
to determine which governmental records should be designated
as "public." 5 The first approach considers only the nature of
the proceedings recorded. The primary issue is whether the
particular function of the agency to which the document per-
tains was "public" or "private" in nature. Thus, for example,
it has been held that records of preliminary proceedings are not
"public records" because the proceedings did not reach a final
determination and, therefore, are not of a public nature. 6
The second approach concentrates on the relationship of
the agency in custody of the record to the government. In an
12 519 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Ky. 1974).
,3 Id. With regard to such exceptions, the Court stated:
We note that accident reports are made confidential for use by the city
by virtue of KRS 189.630, and it appears likely that it would not be in the
public interest to disclose the details of some police investigations prema-
turely for otherwise the purpose of the investigations might be thwarted.
We also think that part of the judgment which grants the right to inspect
all tax records is overly broad. The city contends that information contained
in occupational tax returns is of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which
would give competitive advantage to others engaged in a like occupation.
There may be other tax records, not specifically called to our attention by
this record, which would be exempt from inspection upon proper considera-
tion. KRS 131.190 is indicative of some legislative policy in this regard.
14 Id.
25 For a discussion of the problems encountered in defining what constitutes a
"public record," see Note, Iowa's Freedom of Information Act: Everything You've
Always Wanted to Know About Public Records But Were Afraid to Ask, 57 IOWA L.
REV. 1163 (1972).
,1 Industrial Comm'n v. Holohan, 397 P.2d 624 (Ariz. 1904). See generally Com-
ment, The Right to Inspect Public Records in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. REv. 354, 361 (1974).
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illustrative case,' 7 a New York petitioner was denied access to
certain documents held by the city bridge and tunnel author-
ity. The court reasoned that, despite the city's delegation of
public functions to the authority, a public benefit corporation,
it was not an arm of the municipal government.
Neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory be-
cause each possesses the inherent potential for abuse. The
court's determination is necessarily dependent upon either the
particular governmental structure or the agency's classification
of its own proceedings. Thus, an agency can shield many docu-
ments from public inspection by arbitrarily designating certain
proceedings as nonpublic or by delegating certain functions to
quasi-governmental units. This deficiency could be overcome
by adoption of the broad definition of public records stated in
St. Matthews, but without the Court's qualifying language.
This would require that any denial of access to governmental
papers be based on compelling policy reasons rather than on a
technical definition. The designation of a public policy as
"compelling" would require a careful balancing of the two re-
maining aspects of the St. Matthews test.
B. The Requirement of an "Interest"
In accordance with the statutory reference to "inspection
by any interested person,"'" the Court held in St. Matthews
that an applicant must show a sufficient "interest" in order to
gain access to public documents. However, the Court's defini-
tion of the requisite interest as "a wholesome public interest or
a legitimate private interest"2 represents a significant depar-
ture from the restrictive interest requirements of the past.
Access to public documents was severely limited by the
, New York Post Corp. v. Moses, 176 N.E.2d 709, 219 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1961).
" Id. at 711,219 N.Y.S.2d at 9, citing Plumbing, Heating, Piping & Air Condition-
ing Contractors Ass'n v. New York Thruway Auth., 155 N.E.2d 238, 240, 185 N.Y.S.2d
534, 537 (1959):
However close such relationship [between the State and the Authority] may
be, though, it is abundantly clear that the Authority stands on its own feet,
transacts it business affairs through its own personnel and on its own initia-
tive and is not subject to the strict requirements imposed upon a board or
department of the State. . ..
" KRS § 171.650 (1971). For the complete wording of the statute see note 5 supra.
519 S.W.2d at 815.
1975]
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early common law. 2' The general rule allowed inspection only
with the consent of the Crown. 22 The English courts, however,
recognized a "special interest" exception to this rule, by virtue
of which the petitioner was granted access to the records if he
could show that it was necessary to examine them in order to
maintain or defend a legal action. 23 The majority of American
courts, interpreting this exception to preclude inspection with-
out a litigation interest,24 have rejected the common law rule.1
Kentucky has been cited as following the restrictive "spe-
cial interest" rule. 26 However, a careful study of the Kentucky
cases in this area reveals that if Kentucky has followed this
rule, it has done so only in dictum. Of the five Kentucky cases
other than St. Matthews involving access to public records, 
2
only three have dealt with the interest issue. Motch v. City of
Middlesboro5 involved a group of citizens who sought to in-
spect the records of the city merely to ascertain its financial
status. The Court found that under a statute the records of the
city were public and subject to inspection. Without discussion
of the absence of a litigation interest, the petitioners were
granted a writ of mandamus allowing them to audit the city's
books.29 Fayette County v. Martin31 acknowledged acceptance
" CROSS 25. See Fayette County v. Martin, 130 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Ky. 1939);
Shelby County v. Memphis Abstract Co., 203 S.W. 339, 340 (Tenn. 1918).
2 Campbell, Public Access to Government Documents, 41 AusTL. L.J. 73, 77
(1967). The basis for the restrictive common law rule can be attributed to the desire
of the Royalty to protect themselves from rivals and to the medieval propensity to view
governmental papers in strict proprietary terms.
2 CRoss 25-26. See Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N. W. 749, 750-51 (Mich. 1928). It has
been suggested that the litigation interest rule was not exclusionary but merely one
instance in which access would be granted. Comment, Inspection of Public Records,
11 U. KAN. L. REv. 157, 159 (1962).
24 See generally CROSS.
21 Id. at 55-56.
1 66 AM. JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 15 (1973).
21 Courier Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. McDonald, 524 S.W.2d 633 (Ky.
1974); Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. Curtis, 335 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1959),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960); Fayette County v. Martin, 130 S.W.2d 838 (Ky.
1939); Motch v. City of Middlesboro, 47 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1932); Barrickman v. Lyman,
157 S.W. 924 (Ky. 1913).
Barrickman v. Lyman did not examine the interest requirement issue because the
petitioner satisfied the common law test by maintaining a suit against the city. Courier
Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. McDonald was resolved solely on a standing issue.
-8 47 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1932).
21 Id. at 57. The statute involved was Ky. STAT. § 3255, which now appears as KRS
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of the litigation interest rule but turned on a statute prohibit-
ing disclosure of the information in question.3' In Courier-
Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. Curtis,3 2 the Court's deci-
sion, although "based squarely upon the common-law rule,
. . . engrafted some new concepts upon that rule" by creating
a presumption that the requisite interest existed with regard to
specified classes of documents.33
In St. Matthews the Court of Appeals made its position
clear by explicitly abandoning the litigation interest rule:
We cannot find any valid basis in our society for the imposi-
tion of the requirement of the interest stated in the common
law rule as a prerequisite to the right to inspect public rec-
ords. The rule originated under a monarchic form of govern-
ment in which the people were subjects of the Crown. It
seems to us that a rule which had its genesis under that type
of government is likely to be ill-suited for application in a
democratic society where the government is administered by
elected representatives of the people. . . . We consider the
§ 85.340 and provides: "All records of the city are public records, and at all reasonable
times shall be open for inspection by the public. Copies of such records, attested by
the lawful custodian, shall be competent evidence in all courts."
130 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1939).
' Id. at 844. In this case Fayette County was seeking access to certain tax records
filed with the state Commissioner of Revenue. The Court denied access because, inter
alia, counties are not included within the statutory language authorizing the Kentucky
Tax Commission to grant any "city" the right to inspect tax records on a confidential
basis. Since the county was not within this exception to the statutory prohibition on
disclosure of information contained in tax schedules and returns, the county officials
were denied access without regard to any showing of interest. See KRS § 131.190
(1970).
32 335 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960).
City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811, 813,
(1974). The Court used the following language in Curtis to create the presumption:
Generally the interest required under the rule must be alleged and proven.
However, in order to effectuate the notice-giving purpose of various recording
acts such interest shall hereafter be presumed as to the following records:
(1) Records of all papers, documents and instruments required or per-
mitted by statute to be recorded, or noted of record, in books provided by
public funds for that purpose.
(2) All financial records required by statute to be kept in books so
provided.
The presumption shall govern where papers, documents and instru-
ments are required or permitted by statute to be recorded in such books and
have been lodged for that purpose but unrecorded.
335 S.W.2d 934, 937.
1975]
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necessity of showing an interest such as would enable a per-
son to maintain or defend a lawsuit as a prerequisite to his
right to inspect a public record to be an unwarranted impedi-
ment to the right of people generally to acquire information
concerning the operation of their government . . . .Y
Two recent actions by the Kentucky General Assembly
may have influenced the Court's decision to at last dispose of
the litigation interest requirement. The Court noted the pas-
sage of the "Sunshine Law" 35 as an indication of legislative
policy favoring free access to governmental information." Per-
haps more influential, although not mentioned, was a proposed
amendment to KRS § 171.650 which passed the 1974 General
Assembly but was vetoed after adjournment.3 7 The amendment
would have broadened the scope of the statute from "inspec-
tion by any interested person" to "inspection by any member
of the public. '39 This amendment would also have brought the
Kentucky law into line with the language contained in the
statutes of most other jurisdictions. 0 This demonstration of
34 519 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1974).
KRS §§ 61.805 et seq. (Supp. 1974). See note 4 supra.
519 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Ky. 1974).
31 House Bill 22 was passed by the 1974 General Assembly to amend KRS §
171.650 as follows:
Unless otherwise provided by law or federal regulation, all papers, books, and
other records of any matter required by law or administrative rule to be kept
by any agency (,) of the state, its counties, cities, school districts and other
political subdivisions which receive funds derived from public taxation, and
all records arising from the exercise of functions (authorized thereby,) by
these agencies are public records and shall be open to inspection by any
(interested person) member of the public subject to reasonable rules as to
time and place of inspection (established under KRS 12.080). A certified
copy of any public records, subject to any such rules in effect, shall be
furnished by the custodian thereof(,) to any (person) member of the public
requesting it, upon payment of such reasonable fee therefore as may be
prescribed by law or by administrative rule.
S. JOUR. 769 (1974) (final form as passed) (language in parentheses was to be deleted
from statute; portions italicized were to be inserted).
The bill passed the House with a 92-2 majority, 1 H.R. JouR. 258 (1974) and the
Senate with a 25-1 majority, S. JouR. 1643 (1974). It was subsequently vetoed April 2,
1974 (on record in the office of the Secretary of State).
- KRS § 171.650 (1971). See note 5 supra.
3' House Bill 22, supra note 37.
The right of inspection has been granted to taxpayers (LA. REv. STAT. § 44:31
(1950); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24 (1962)), citizens (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §
405 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-304 (1973)), and the general public (Administrative
COMMENTS
legislative dissatisfaction with the interest requirement may
well have provided the impetus for the Court's rejection of the
litigation interest requirement in St. Matthews.
The statutory limitation of the right to inspect to "any
interested person" mandated that the Court retain some type
of interest requirement. Therefore, the rigid common law rule
was replaced in St. Matthews with the requirement that "the
right to demand inspection of public records must be premised
upon a purpose which tends to advance or further a wholesome
public interest or a legitimate private interest."41 The opinion
gives little guidance concerning the manner in which this test
is to be interpreted and applied.42 Without such guidance,
vague terms such as "wholesome" and "legitimate" are not
susceptible to clear definition. Thus, lower courts faced with
future cases involving access to public documents will be forced
to rely upon their moral judgment to determine the sufficiency
and appropriateness of the interest advanced by the petitioner.
Unfortunately, it seems inevitable that this will result in dis-
parity among the circuit courts in the balancing of the appli-
cant's interest and the countervailing public policies.
C. The Balancing of Countervailing Policy Considerations
The final test for determining if disclosure is warranted
involves balancing the policy favoring free access to informa-
tion and the public policies against disclosure in certain cases.
43
Obviously, some records contain information which, for various
reasons, should not be divulged to the public at large. The
court must satisfy itself, after weighing the competing policies,
that release of the document is in the public interest.
In St. Matthews, the Court of Appeals placed the burden
Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2), as amended, (Supp. I, 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. §
192.420 (1973)). For a compilation of all state statutes governing access to public
records see S. THURM AN, THE RIGHT OF AccEss TO INFORMATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT
67-84 (1973).
41 519 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1974).
42 The Court did state that purposes such as "idle curiosity" and "public scandal"
would not be satisfactory interests. Id. It might be asked whether an interest in expos-
ing governmental corruption would be considered a "wholesome" interest or merely an
interest in public scandal.
11 Id. at 815.
19751
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of justifying a denial of access to a record on the custodian of
the record, rather than on the petitioner.4 In other words, once
the petitioner has established that he has a "wholesome" and
"legitimate" purpose for viewing the records, the custodian
must prove that a valid public interest in confidentiality out-
weighs the individual's interest in disclosure.
The Kentucky General Assembly has designated several
areas in which the need for confidentiality must take prece-
dence by specifically excluding records in these areas from pub-
lic inspection. When access to any of these records is sought,
the issue is whether the particular item is encompassed by the
statute. Examples of such exclusions are documents pertaining
to adoption proceedings, 5 dissolutions of marriage," annul-
ment actions,4 7 illegitimate births,48 paternity actions,49 and
juvenile court proceedings. As evidenced by this listing, the
statutes generally exclude documents containing highly per-
sonal information, disclosure of which would greatly infringe on
various individuals' right to privacy.
Certainly, there are records outside the statutory exclu-
sions whose publication would be undesirable. The major con-
siderations that weigh against disclosure may be grouped into
four main categories. 1 First, the right of privacy must be pre-
served. Extensive personal data is collected and stored by var-
ious units of government. Evaluations of character, results of
aptitude tests, and information on family background are
prime examples of such sensitive data.52 A recent legislative
11 Id. See also Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 98 N.E. 467 (N.Y. 1912).
' KRS § 199.570 (1971).
" KRS §§ 213.320-.340 (Supp. 1974).
" KRS § 213.340 (1971).
" KRS § 213.050 (Supp. 1974).
4' KRS § 406.035 (Supp. 1974).
KRS § 208.340 (1971). Some other specifically excluded records are those of the
Handicapped Children's Commission (KRS § 200.490), certain records of the Human
Resources Commission (KRS § 195.060), estate tax records (KRS § 140.170), public
assistance records (KRS § 205.175), records of inmates in state mental institutions
(KRS §§ 210.230-.235), and the Fire Prevention Commission's investigative reports
(KRS § 227.260).
11 Campbell, supra note 22, at 76.
52 Other personal information in government files can have a dramatic detrimen-
tal effect on the people involved. See, e.g., Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d 623
(Fla. 1962) (denying access to records naming persons as committed narcotics addicts).
[Vol. 64
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recognition of this concern is the enactment of the Privacy Act
of 1974,53 which gives an individual the right to learn what
information concerning him is on file with federal government
units and specifies strict conditions under which such personal
data may be revealed to third parties. The second category
concerns the state's duty to protect property rights and fair
competition. 4 For instance, trade secrets warrant protection
from potential competitors. The propriety of excluding such
records from public inspection is demonstrated by protective
provisions in the Freedom of Information Act.5 The third cate-
gory acknowledges that the confidentiality of certain records
may be essential to the fulfillment of agency objectives. This
class includes premature disclosure of reports pertaining to law
enforcement activities, such as police investigations.56 If release
of such information would defeat the purpose for which the
agency was established, access should be allowed only after
careful consideration. However, there is no reason why reports
of investigations which have long since been closed should be
Also of interest is a recent law passed by the Tennessee legislature restricting the
disclosure of records kept on state hospital patients and personal records kept on
students. TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-305 (Supp. 1974). Information contained in tax returns
might also be included in this category. See City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St.
Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811, 816 (1974); KRS § 131.190 (1974 Supp.).
"3 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. I, 1975).
5, For example, concern that disclosure of certain information contained in occu-
pational tax returns "would give competitive advantage to others engaged in a like
occupation" surfaced in St. Matthews. 519 S.W.2d at 816.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4)(1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1975).
za In St. Matthews, the Court stated: "[I]t appears likely that it would not be in
the public interest to disclose the details of some police investigations prematurely for
otherwise the purpose of the investigations might be thwarted." 519 S.W.2d at 816.
This problem is dealt with in the Freedom of Information Act in the following
manner:
(b) [Tihis section does not apply to matters that are ...
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but
only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere
with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial
or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in
the case of a record compiled by a criminal investigation, confidential infor-
mation furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel.
5 U.S.C. § 552(1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1975).
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kept confidential.5 Finally, certain volunteered information
should not be made public. 5 Much vital information, including
statistical data and informants' statements, is received condi-
tioned upon the promise of confidentiality. Breach of such
agreements could serve to deprive the government of essential
intelligence sources.
After identifying the petitioner's interest and the counter-
vailing public policies, St. Matthews requires that these con-
siderations be weighed against one another.59 This balancing of
interests is both the final and most important step in the St.
Matthews test. It, like the other factors set out in the decision,
depends upon the sound judgment of the trial court. Conse-
quently, although the Court of Appeals has laid the foundation
for an expansion of the public's right to examine government
records, the final limits of that right will be determined by the
manner in which judicial discretion is exercised at the trial
court level.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO INSPECT PUBLIC RECORDS
In Kentucky, as in most states,60 the only available means
of enforcing the right to inspect public documents is a petition
for a writ of mandamus. 1 Although this common law writ is
deemed an extraordinary remedy and discretionary in charac-
ter,62 it seems unlikely that a petitioner who satisfies the re-
quirements of St. Matthews will be denied the order. Neverthe-
less, there are serious practical problems which render manda-
mus inadequate as an enforcement procedure. Petitioning the
court for mandamus can involve prohibitive costs and delays,
51 Campbell, supra note 22, at 76. But see Whittle v. Munshower, 155 A.2d 670
(Md. 1959). For a discussion of the problems generally involved in the disclosure of
police files, see Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility
of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 365-71 (1966).
Campbell, supra note 22, at 77.
5' 519 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1974).
CROss 30-31. See generally Annot., 169 A.L.R. 653 (1947); Annot., 60 A.L.R.
1356 (1929). Most public records statutes appear to give an absolute right to inspect.
However, due to the discretionary character of the mandamus procedure, "the right
of inspection of most public records is 'absolute in theory' and 'qualified in practice.'"
State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 75 S.W. 948, 958 (Tenn. 1903).
e' See, e.g., Motch v. City of Middlesboro, 47 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1939).
62 52 Am. JUR. 2D Mandamus §§ 5-6 (1970).
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especially if the decision is appealed. The attorney's fees and
court costs alone would preclude the average taxpayer from
pursuing the matter. Additionally, a petitioner with the neces-
sary resources may be denied effective access to documents due
to excessive delay created by overcrowded court dockets. In
view of these inherent deficiencies in the mandamus procedure,
it would be advantageous for the Kentucky legislature to de-
velop an alternative method of enforcing the right to view pub-
lic records.
The statutes of other jurisdictions provide models for more
effective procedures to enforce the right of access to public
documents. Two viable approaches have been developed to
reduce the costs of enforcement proceedings. The first ap-
proach, implemented in the Freedom of Information Act," pro-
vides for the assessment of attorney's fees and court costs
against the government when access to documents has been
wrongfully denied. The availability of such a recovery may be
enhanced by requiring only that the petitioner "substantially
prevail" in court.64 The second cost-reducing alternative is the
development of a simple administrative procedure for enforce-
ment. The Oregon public record inspection statute" provides
an excellent example of this type of scheme. This statute per-
mits persons who have been denied access to public documents
to make a request for production through the state attorney
general or the district attorney.66 The administrative decision
may be appealed to the courts and, if erroneous, attorney's fees
may be assessed against the state.
The prompt disposition of requests for records has been a
major goal of most modern access-to-documents statutes. The
5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(E) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1975).
" Id. "The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which
the complainant has substantially prevailed."
" ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 192.410-.500 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ORS]. For an
expanded treatment of Oregon's inspection statutes, see Comment, The Right to In-
spect Public Records in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. REv. 354, 363-65 (1974).
11 ORS §§ 192.450-.460 (1973). However, if the documents are held by an elected
official, the original petition must be submitted to the appropriate circuit court. ORS
§ 192.480 (1973). A form for the petition is conveniently provided in the statutes. ORS
§ 192.470 (1973).
67 ORS § 192.490(3) (1973).
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most direct means is exemplified by the Oregon requirement
that a petition be administratively granted or denied within
three business days after receipt." The expedition of a final
judicial determination is also essential. This has been accom-
plished by assigning a request for access to documents priority
over most other matters on the court's docket."
Delay and costs to both the petitioner and the state have
been reduced by the imposition of punitive measures against
custodians of public records who wrongfully impede free access
to them. The possibility of such sanctions requires custodians
to base any denial of access upon valid public policy rather
than mere intractability. The punitive measures currently
employed range from a moderate fine in Alabama" to the refer-
ral of the offender to a disciplinary body under the Freedom of
Information Act.71 All of these measures have experienced at
least limited success and should be considered by Kentucky for
improvement of the current enforcement procedure.
CONCLUSION
In Kentucky, exercise of the right to inspect public docu-
ments has been frustrated by uncertainty concerning the scope
of the right and lack of effective enforcement procedures. The
Court of Appeals, in City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Mat-
thews, Inc. ,72 has done much to remove the first of these obsta-
cles. The Court's liberalized interest requirement, in conjunc-
tion with its new three-step approach for determining whether
to grant access and its allocation of the burden of justifying a
denial of access to the custodian of the record, should serve to
6' ORS § 192.450(1) (1973).
' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1975); ORS § 192.490(2)
(1973): "Except as to causes the court considers of greater importance, proceedings
arising under O.R.S. 192.450 to 192.480 take precedence on the docket over all other
causes and shall be assigned for hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date and
expedited in every way."
71 ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 146 (1959).
11 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1975). If the court issues
a written decision that the person in charge of the records in question acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in denying inspection, the Civil Service Commission is to initiate
proceedings to determine if disciplinary actions are needed. The Commission's recom-
mendation is forwarded to the agency involved for corrective action.
72 519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1974).
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make the right to examine public records more meaningful for
Kentucky citizens.
Despite these advances, further changes are needed in
order to promote the policy of citizen access to governmental
information. More precise guidelines for application of the
Court's new approach, as well as more effective enforcement
procedures, must be developed. To avoid wholesale exclusion
of governmental documents through a technical definition of
"public record," all records generated by governmental units
should be considered "public." Access to a public record should
be denied only when the interests of the petitioner and the
policy of encouraging an informed citizenry are outweighed by
policies favoring confidentiality. Given the amount of discre-
tion inherent in such a balancing process, the parameters of the
right to inspect public records will be largely determined by the
judiciary, particularly the trial courts.
The mandamus proceeding, with its concomitant delays
and costs, is inadequate as an enforcement device for persons
denied access to public records. A detailed administrative rem-
edy, including reasonable sanctions against government offi-
cials who wrongfully withhold information, would provide more
effective and efficient enforcement of the right to access. The
process could be further expedited by providing priority to ju-
dicial review with the allowance of attorney's fees and court
costs to a prevailing applicant.
In a democracy every citizen has the right to be informed
concerning the operation of his government. This basic right
can be effected only through laws guarantying citizens access
to governmental records. The St. Matthews decision is a step
toward providing that guaranty. The judiciary and the legisla-
ture must take further steps, however, in order to fully guar-
anty the right of access to public documents.
Carla Whitaker Allen
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